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RESPONSE
THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK AND
THE COMMONS
Elinor Ostromt
Let me commend Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Kath-
erine Strandburg for writing such an interesting and useful article on
the study of commons in cultural environments. We have tried to de-
velop a useful framework for analyzing a wide variety of questions.
Their adoption of a modified form of our Institutional Analysis and
Development (LAD) framework for this important set of questions re-
assures us that we met our goal. Charlotte Hess and I organized a
conference and coedited a book that examined some aspects of the
knowledge commons using the IAD framework.' We have learned
that aspects of cultural environments can be thought of as "cultural
commons" because cultural products (e.g., new knowledge or
software) are often available to many users who do not have to pay the
producer in order to use those products.2 Many important questions
related to the study of cultural commons await a careful institutional
analysis.
The LAD framework has a long history that may be interesting to
the readers of this issue. Larry Kiser was a visiting scholar at the Work-
shop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University
(Workshop) during the early 1980s, when we were engaged in exten-
sive discussions about how to conduct institutional studies. Roger
Parks, Gordon Whitaker, and other colleagues had just completed the
fieldwork for an extensive series of studies related to the organization
t Elinor Ostrom is Senior Research Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Pol-
icy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408; e-mail: ostrom@indiana.edu. The
National Science Foundation, Ford Foundation, and MacArthur Foundation have sup-
ported the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework over the years. I ap-
preciate the helpful comments made by Charles Schweik and the excellent editing of Patty
Lezotte.
1 See UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRAcrICE (Char-
lotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE].
2 See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 1, at 3-4, 13-20.
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and performance of police agencies in U.S. metropolitan areas.3 Pub-
lic-administration scholars assumed that most public services benefit-
ted from economies of scale and should be produced by one
government serving a metropolitan area. 4 Reform efforts sought to
consolidate schools in the United States.5 Proposals in the late 1960s
advocated consolidating most police departments in the metropolitan
areas of the United States.6
Given our skepticism regarding the theory used to support these
proposals (and the lack of empirical studies), we conducted studies of
police department performance in Indianapolis, Chicago, St. Louis,
and in eighty U.S. metropolitan areas. 7 Our data and analyses showed
that the most effective systems of governance for police services used
small- to medium-sized police departments to provide direct services,
such as patrols and 911 response, and larger departments to provide
indirect services, such as training, forensics, and radio communica-
tions.8 When large police departments provided both direct and indi-
rect services to metropolitan areas, those areas did not realize any
gains in performance or lower costs. 9
3 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, ROGER B. PARKS & GORDON P. WHITAKER, PATTERNS OF
METROPOLITAN POLICING (1978) (presenting an overview of the organization of police ser-
vices in metropolitan America) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN POLICING]; Elinor Ostrom &
Roger B. Parks, Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of
Metropolitan Organization, in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM
THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS 284 (Michael D. McGinnis ed.,
1999) [hereinafter POLYCENTRICITY] (arguing that complex solutions to the complex
problems inherent in urban police organizations are likely more effective than the simple
solutions advocated by many social scientists); Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks & Gordon P.
Whitaker, Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Asser-
tions, 33 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423 (1973) (presenting data and analysis showing that aggregat-
ing police services may not always be preferable to decentralizing such services).
4 See, e.g., AMos H. HAwLEY & BASIL G. ZIMMER, THE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY. ITS
PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT 3 (1970) ("Given the diagnosis the treatment seems just as appar-
ent: consolidate the many political units under a single, over-arching municipal
government.").
5 See BASIL G. ZIMMER & AMos H. HAWLEY, METROPOLITAN AREA SCHOOLS: RESISTANCE
TO DISTRICT REORGANIZATION 27-29 (1968); David L. Kirp & David K. Cohen, Education and
Metropolitanism, in METROPOLITANIZATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES 29, 29-30 (Lowdon Wingo
ed., 1972).
6 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 119-23 (1967).
7 See METROPOLITAN POLICING, supra note 3, at 7-22; see also James C. McDavid, In-
tejurisdictional Cooperation Among Police Departments in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area, 4 PUB-
LIUS 35, 41-58 (1974); Elinor Ostrom. & Gordon P. Whitaker, Community Control and
Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Neighborhoods, in IMPROVING THE QUAL-
ITY OF URBAN MANAGEMENT 303, 317-34 (Willis D. Hawley & David Rogers eds., 1974).
8 See METROPOLITAN POLICING, supra note 3, at xxxi-xxxv.
9 See Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks & Gordon P. Whitaker, Policing: Is There a System?,
in 5 SAGE YEARBOOKS IN POLITICS & PUBLIC POLICY. THE POLICY CYCLE 111, 124-43 (Judith
V. May & Aaron B. Wildavsky eds., 1978).
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Discussions at the Workshop centered on how to establish a bet-
ter theoretical underpinning for analyzing institutional arrangements,
an underpinning that could serve all of the different policy areas that
our colleagues had studied-including water resources' 0 and local
roads' 1 -and account for the importance of polycentric institutional
arrangements for many services.1 2 Larry Kiser and I drafted a paper
on The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional
Approaches.'5 This paper was our effort to identify the differences
among actions at an operational level (such as calling on a local police
department or taking water from the tap), at a collective-choice level
(such as making policies regarding speed limits on local roads), or at
a constitutional level (such as revising constitutional provisions about
the authority of municipalities to make collective-choice decisions).
In that era-and still today-a major challenge was just to pro-
vide a coherent definition of the term "institution.' 4 Political scien-
tists, economists, lawyers, and sociologists tended to use the term
"institution" imprecisely by using it to refer to local buildings (like a
jail), to organizations (such as the members of a city council), and to
formal laws. 15 Rules that groups of individuals evolve for themselves,
such as those developed in the early days of writing open source
software and discussed by Madison et al.,16 de Laat, 17 Markus,' 8 and
O'Mahony, t9 are a challenge for scholars to understand and model.20
In our first published effort to lay out a framework, Larry Kiser
and I initially identified a set of variables that would characterize an
action situation related to any type of service provision or production
10 See Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource
Development, 48 LAND ECON. 1, 5-8 (1972).
11 See Ronald Oakerson, Erosion of Public Goods: The Case of Coal-Haul Roads in Eastern
Kentucky, 2 REs. IN PUB. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 73-102 (1981).
12 See Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity (Part 1), in POLYCENTRICITY, supra note 3, at 52,
69-73; Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity (Part 2), in POLYCENTRICITY, supra note 3, at 119,
126-32.
13 See Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Syn-
thesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 179 (Elinor Ostrom ed.,
1982).
14 See id. at 190-95; see also AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN
ECONOMY. LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 3-28 (2006) (discussing the evolution and con-
tested nature of institutional analysis in economics and political science).
15 See GREIF, supra note 14.
16 See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Construct-
ing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 657, 661 (2010).
17 See Paul B. de Laat, Governance of Open Source Software: State of the Art, lIJ. MGMT. &
GOVERNANCE 165, 166-72 (2007).
18 See M. Lynne Markus, The Governance of Free/Open Source Software Projects: Monolithic,
Multidimensional, or Configurational?, IJ. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 151, 154-58 (2007).
19 See Siobhdn O'Mahony, The Governance of Open Source Initiatives: What Does It Mean to
Be Community Managed?, 11 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 139, 144-48 (2007).
20 See Vincent Ostrom, Artisanship and Artifact, 40 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 309, 312-14
(1980).
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at any of the three levels of analysis. 21 Game theory was a powerful
tool that enabled scholars to develop mathematical models of specific
situations and predict the expected behavior of rational individuals in
such well-specified situations. To identify the relevant structural ele-
ments of a game and predict outcomes, the theorist had to posit the
1. number of actors;
2. positions they held (e.g., row or column player);
3. amount of information available to an actor;
4. set of actions that actors could take at specific nodes in a deci-
sion tree;
5. set of functions that mapped actors and actions at decision
nodes into intermediate or final outcomes;
6. outcomes that actors jointly affected; and
7. benefits and costs assigned to actions and outcomes. 22
We proposed that the working parts of a game are best conceptu-
alized as the universal working parts of an "action situation. '23 The
added advantage of relying on game theory to specify the working
parts of an action situation was the ability to rely on years of game
theorists' research to analyze different situations using these same
components. Further, this reliance assured that the working parts of
an action situation could be the same for a framework, a theory, or a
model.
Using the basic components of a game provided an excellent
foundation for building a common method to analyze different action
situations. No similar foundation existed for understanding the diver-
sity of structures for action situations that had the same "name" in the
literature, such as a bureaucracy, an election, or a legislature. Most
institutional theorists started their analyses by specifying the current
structure of the situation they wanted to analyze. They might have
examined development over time within a market or a bureaucracy,
but they rarely analyzed the rules and other factors that affected the
initial structure of a situation. Political scientists, by contrast, under-
stood that electoral laws broadly affected the likelihood of two-party
or multiparty organization and the strategies of individuals seeking
election. The two groups frequently argued, however, about what was
the "best" way to model all electoral behavior (or behavior within leg-
islatures or bureaucracies) as if there were only one structure!
Thus, the next important step in developing the LAD framework
was to develop a common language for examining the underlying
21 See Kiser & Ostrom, supra note 13, at 184-205.
22 See Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the Study of Institutions, 48 PUB. CHOICE 3, 17
(1986).
23 See, e.g., id.
810 [Vol. 95:807
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structure of diverse action situations. From earlier work on the nature
of goods,2 4 we concluded that part of the underlying structure came
from the nature of the goods involved or the biophysical world. From
fieldwork related to groundwater 25 and policing,2 6 we discovered that
another important part of the underlying structure came from the
community background of those participating. In addition to the bio-
physical and community foundation for an action situation, an under-
standing of the relationship between the rules that affect a situation
and the resulting outcomes generated by participants is also impor-
tant. If an action situation has seven working parts, then logically
seven types of rules could affect the action situation. In my presiden-
tial address to the Public Choice Society, I outlined the following types
of rules:
1. Boundary rules that specify how actors are to be chosen to
enter or leave a situation
2. Position rules that specify a set of positions and how many ac-
tors hold each one
3. Information rules that specify channels of communication
among actors and what information must, may, or must not be
shared
4. Authority rules that specify which actions are assigned to a po-
sition at a node
5. Aggregation rules (such as majority or unanimity rules) that
specify how the decisions of actors at a node are to be mapped
to intermediate or final outcomes
6. Scope rules that specify the outcomes that could be affected
7. Payoff rules that specify how benefits and costs are to be dis-
tributed to actors in positions2 7
Open source software (OSS) projects have developed a variety of
these rules to solve collective-action and coordination problems. As
Markus concludes in her analysis of the governance of OSS projects,
the participants in creating and using new software have devised many
different rules to try to solve two problems that repeatedly occur in
OSS projects: collective-action problems (e.g., overcoming incentives
not to participate and instead to let others do the hard work of devel-
oping software that one can then use) and coordination problems
(achieving a high-quality product that is produced by multiple individ-
24 See, e.g., Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices, in ALTER-
NATIVES FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES: TOwARD IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 7, 9-18 (E.S.
Savas ed., 1977).
25 See Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 10, at 6-9.
26 See METROPOLITAN POLICING, supra note 3, at xxix.
27 See Ostrom, supra note 22, at 19.
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uals working independently in separate locations).28 As in the govern-
ance of common pool resources, none of the specific rules that
participants create in particular projects appear to best solve these
problems, but Markus calls for new research to examine rule struc-
tures, incentives, and outcomes more closely.
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg suggest that scholars inter-
ested in cultural commons may find the lAD framework sufficiently
useful for analyzing cultural commons in contrast to analyzing pat-
terns of interactions and outcomes related to common pool re-
sources.29 They point out an important difference that will make the
analysis of the rules affecting an action situation more significant:
"[U]nlike commons in the natural-resource environment, cultural-
commons arrangements usually must create a governance structure
within which participants not only share existing resources but also
engage in producing those resources."30 These scholars also point out
that this difference leads to a much "more intertwined set of exoge-
nous variables."31 I think it also leads to more difficult legal relation-
ships between those who produce knowledge and those who use the
knowledge that others produce.
A recent report about the possibility of scholars breaking em-
bargo rules on the use of data produced by someone else illustrates
this challenge. 32 Laura Bierut, a psychiatrist at Washington University
in St. Louis, discovered that another researcher had broken an em-
bargo and published a major scientific paper in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) in late August based on data that
Professor Bierut had collected. 33 Bierut and her colleagues at Wash-
ington University in St. Louis had followed the rules regarding depos-
iting data in the National Institute of Health's database of genotypes
and phenotypes (dbGaP). Because their research was funded by a Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) grant as part of the Study of Addic-
tion: Genetics and Environment project, they had to deposit data very
quickly after verifying their accuracy and relevance. The database
"was established in 2006 to facilitate sharing of the oceans of genetic
data generated by federal grantees. Other scientists can submit pa-
pers based on the material after an embargo period of 9 to 12 months
so those who generated the data can have first crack at analyzing
them."34 In this instance, the embargo expired one month after PNAS
28 See Markus, supra note 18, at 155-60.
29 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 16, at 681.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Constance Holden, Paper Retracted Following Genome Data Breach, 325 SCIENCE
1486 (2009).
33 See id.
34 Id.
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published the article and six months after the researcher submitted
the paper.
Laura Bierut sent e-mails to PNAS, to NIH officials, and to Yale
University-the academic home of the author of the paper that broke
the embargo. Officials at NIH indicated that they were "working with
all parties to figure out how the breach occurred-and how to ensure
it won't happen again. ' 35 Although Laura Bierut indicated both satis-
faction with the rapid response to the infraction and agreement with
the basic NIH policy, other scholars were not so supportive. 36 Michael
Miller, a psychologist at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
pointed out that "[o] ther teams can start working with the data almost
as soon as the group that collected the data."37 This arrangement en-
ables researchers who are not spending time collecting data to devote
all of their time to analyzing data that other researchers collect and
then publish right at the end of the embargo period. Nicholas Mar-
tin, a behavioral geneticist at the Queensland Institute for Medical
Research in Brisbane, Australia, points out that "[t] he relatively short
embargo periods 'leave ... the gate open for predators with no invest-
ment in the data to do quick-and-dirty analyses that pick the eyes out
of the data without looking at any of the subtleties.'" 38
This incident opens a very interesting set of questions for scholars
who wish to pursue future research on the institutional structure and
outcomes that scientific communities achieve and how rules affect the
linked action situations of producing new and accurate information
and of analyzing the data for publication. Scholars who wish to pur-
sue the questions Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg raise could
analyze the obligations that NIH and other U.S. government-funding
agencies impose on researchers who receive government grants to
make their data available to others. Rules related to the production of
generally accessible data include the following:
* Who must deposit their data?
" How soon after production and authentication of data do re-
searchers have to deposit the data?
" How long should the embargo last?
" How should conformance to the rules be monitored?
" How many researchers are involved in producing and analyzing
the particular kind of data?
" Should an infraction be made public in order to tarnish the
reputation of the infringer?
35 Id. at 1487.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. (alteration in original).
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Researchers interested in the software-development aspects of
cultural commons could follow the lead of scholars such as Schweik, 39
Markus, 40 and O'Mahony,41 who are addressing the governance ques-
tions related to production and use of OSS. The incentives in this
cultural commons differ from the incentives in the cultural commons
associated with the discovery and publication of new scientific facts
and relationships. Teams of open source software developers tend to
be relatively small, frequently involving fewer than five program-
mers.42 A few, however, involve more than 100 programmers. 43
Norms govern many of the day-to-day activities of the software devel-
opers, rather than public rules or rules fixed in the software-develop-
ment tools themselves, i.e., the biophysical world affecting the action
situation. Schweik has studied these interesting questions: whether
nonprofit foundations federate governance arrangements that create
differences in incentives and outcomes 44 and whether teams of both
volunteer and paid programmers change project governance, as well
as incentives and outcomes.4 5 Further, he is exploring whether open
source hosting sites, such as http://sourceforge.net/, operate some-
what as "matchmakers" for connecting developers with common
needs and interests. 46 Programmers live in widely diverse locations
and may not learn of others' interests and capabilities by just going to
meetings. Open source hosting sites may enable computer scientists
interested in particular types of projects to find a small group of other
programmers-who may live in distant locations-with whom to col-
laborate on a project.
Thus, many interesting questions exist about how various ways of
"constructing commons in cultural environments" generate produc-
tive or adverse incentives for participants. Madison, Frischmann, and
Strandburg have opened a large and productive research agenda for
39 See Charles M. Schweik, An Institutional Analysis Approach to Studying Libre Software
'Commons', 6 UPGRADE: THE EUR. J. FOR THE INFORMATICS PROF. 17, 17, 19-20 (2005);
Charles M. Schweik & Robert English, Tragedy of the FOSS Commons? Investigating the Institu-
tional Designs of Free/Libre and Open Source Software Projects, 12 FiRsr MONDAY 2 (2007), http:/
/firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/ 1619/1534.
40 See Markus, supra note 18, at 155-56.
41 See O'Mahony, supra note 19, at 144-48.
42 See Schweik & English, supra note 39 ("[A]s of April 2005, more than 90 percent of
the projects listed on Sourceforge.net still involve less than five developers.").
43 See Email from Charles M. Schweik, Associate Professor, Univ. Mass. Amherst, to
author (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author).
44 See Michael P. Hamel & Charles M. Schweik, Open Source Collaboration: Two Cases in
the U.S. Public Sector, 14 FrisT MONDAY 1 (2009), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/
bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2313/2065.
45 See Charles M. Schweik et al., Factors Leading to Success or Abandonment of Open Source
Commons: An Empirical Analysis of Sourceforge.net Projects, 2008 FREE AND OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE FOR GEOSPATIAL (FOSS4G) CONF. 108, 111, available at http://www.osgeo.org/
ocs/index.php/foss4g/2008/paper/viewFile/135/55.
46 See id. at 115.
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scholars from many disciplines who are interested in how governance
arrangements in diverse cultural commons affect outcomes.
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